3.3.3. peninsula into two states; India and

3.3.3.  The Essentiality of Kashmir to Pakistan’s Conduct
of Struggle

warfare between Hindu, Sikh, Buddhist alongside some other minority forces,
which assisted the hostile British, and the ancient Islamic authority of the era
on the peninsula developed flickerig movements for the actors of the future
disputes. Notably, Britain faced tough resistance of the Muslims when they
invaded the peninsula in 1819. The British ultimately managed to acquire dominions
over the contentious territory in 1846 following the years of violent battles
against Muslims. Britain subsequently asserted dominance across the the region and
thus ultimately was bound tu draw up the division of the region into three partitions.
Over the peninsula where about 55% of populace were Muslims, the British rule was
directly executed while 565 provinces enjoyed their own autonomous Hindu or Muslim
governors. The piece of the division, known as Kashmir, was sold to Hindu
feudalism for a century in conformity with the treaty, which is recognized as
Amritsar sealed on March 16, 1846 between the sides of British East India
Company and Gulab Singh Dogra to legitimize the arrangements of the peace
treaty following the First Anglo-Sikh War. Accordingly, Jammu and Kashmir was
handed over to Gulab Singh in return for a mere sum of 7.5 million Rupees (some $2,250,000)
for his service at the war and fell under the domination of the Hindus thanks
to such agreement.1  

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The Hindu administration in Kashmir continued to
provide overt and covert support for the British rule till 1947 when the
British separated the peninsula into two states; India and Pakistan according
to their population with the exception of Kashmir. However, the Hindu ruler of
Kashmir joined India without paying any concern to the wishes of the Muslim
people. It should be noted that while the British Hindu Peninsula was divided
into India and Pakistan, the
British Cabinet Mission Memorandum was sent to the executives of
the 565 Indian provinces on 12, 05, 1946 calling on their people that they
should make their decisions to remain independent or accede to one of the two
states; India or Pakistan for their respective provinces.2
Yet, the provinces of Hayderabad, Srinagar and Kashmir were prevented from
participating in their respective state of Pakistan. Especially, the reason for
the prevention of Hayderabad and Srinagar from such an accession to Pakistan
was that the rulers of these provinces were Muslims although the majority of
the population was composed of Hindu. Thus, they joined India whereas the ruler
of Kashmir was Hindu, but most of the population was Muslim, they were not
allowed to join Pakistan, but India. The factor that made it possible for these
three provinces, especially Kashmir to be annexed to India was that the British
favored the Hindus and granted them privileges. Following such a fraud
annexation to Indian side, successive wars broke out between India with the
Hindu rulers on one front and Muslims of Kashmir along with Pakistan on the
other, which concluded with the present form of Kashmir with the portions of
45,62% by India, 35,15% by Pakistan and the remaining 19,23% by China.3

Though generally known as a problem between Pakistan
and India, the Kashmir dispute involves China as well, yet it doesnot come to
the agenda so much as the one between Pakistan and India. Kashmir is
geographically surrounded by Afghanistan over a very small border at the
eastern end of Pakistan, China, India and Wakhan Corridor. It may even be
thought that Kashmir is adjacent to Tajikistan in the north via the narrow
Wakhan Corridor. So Pakistan, China, India, Afghanistan and Tajikistan are the
neighbors of Kashmir. In different aspects, these five countries are the
countries frequently mentioned within regional and global politics. China’s
neighborhood to Kashmir, East Turkestan (Xinjiang-Uyghur Autonomous Region) and
Tibet also make Kashmir both geopolitically and strategically valuable. In a more
general context, Kashmir is actually composed of four parts. North of Kashmir
is controlled by Pakistan and in the west, there stands the Azad Kashmir
Islamic Republic, which is not recognized except for Pakistan, and is under the
control of Pakistan.4 While
in the south lies the Jammnu-Kashmir region controlled by India, in the east,
the area called Aksai China spans, which China added to its country at the end
of the war against India in 1962. Pakistan relinquished its own hold on the
area in favor of China in 1963, thus inflaming Indian insistence on the claims of
such piece of land. The part of Kashmir controlled by China subsequent to
Pakistan’s relinquisment of the sovereignty avails Beijing to control Karakoram
highway, which runs from East Turkestan to the city of Abbottabad in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan and provides the Pakistan-China overland border

With such a partition of Kashmir
among the claimant countries, the magnititude of the region for Pakistan is
strategically undisputable. The motives of strategic value are of various
grounds ranging from offsetting the political balance with India to acting as
protectorate of the Muslims in the region. The strong Kashmir belief mixed
within Pakistani patriotism fed by the notion of the face value gained at
national arena fuels the Pakistani desire to accede the Kashmir to the land of
Pakistan and alternately emerge as a prominent power on the territory in that
Pakistan labors to keep up wih Indian incommensurate attitude
towards the Kashmir issue to counterbalance India’s expansion over the region.5
In retrospect of what was left to be Pakistan upon the partition,  it is obvios that Pakistan was inferior to
India, which grasped the lion’s share out of the partition. Hence Pakistan was
either to be satisfied with the disproportionate portion or to seek for other
means to make up for the disproportional split-up. To balance out the unequal
power disribution, which was lopsided against Pakistan in almost every asset of
the former union,  Pakistan did it best
to seize any favorable circumstances. Taking into account the demarcation
process of the British-designed boundary commission, especially Kashmir, which
was left up in the air, is strategically of paramount importance to Pakistan.
Since the adjacent area is heavily populated by Muslims and such prospect of Indian
seizure on Kashmir is to aggrandize Indian supremacy over the region, Pakistan
has no intention of any to relinquish or fall rather behind India in power
struggle over the dispute. To match India in a security dilemma, Pakistan
applies realism policies in almost every aspect of politics to have the
influential say.6

Over the conflict, the Muslim association of Pakistan
with Kashmiris is strategically exploited to mobilize the Muslims of the region
to challenge for independency against the Hindu ruling so as to undermine the
strength of Indian power across the Pakistani borders. In return, Pakistan
manipulates the situation in its favor to nationally reinforce the overall
security against India. In the course of time spent competing for power, two
belligerent states have confronted one another in four successive armed
conflicts where they came to the threshold of nuclear war, which therefore reins
in both rivals’ undertakings to go further as the retaliation of such nuclear
response would be rather to the very detriment of any side. Yet, Pakistan
wields the proxy warfare to reach their objectives, which is observed through
the upward scale at the hostile encounters with Indian forces.7
Though such proxy skirmishes are prone to being regarded for the freedom of
Muslims in Kashmir, they are more likely to occur owing to the fact that
Pakistan aspires to realize its objectives and also relatively harness Indian
power across the territory.8

Compared to the
past of Kashmir, somewhat rudimentary principles of political and social
democracy for Kashmiris appear to show signs of existence in voting processes.
Such developments have caused Pakistani interference in the affairs of Kashmir to
wane too much to tamper with the results and accordingly begun to lose strong
footings over the area. To reclaim the patriotism and former political power to
sway on Kashmir and alter the situation to their advantage, Pakistan triggered
the war in Kargil district of Jammu and Kashmir in May to July of 1999, as a
consequence of which they lost the war to India again despite the mere possession
of some land and tolls at both sides. The manipulation of similar military
power over strategic Kashmir issue has often been employed by successive
Pakistani governments to substantiate the reason why military power should be maintained
at best for the national security while also staging the traces of offensive
realist approaches in pursuit of possession acccompanied by the utilization
of power.9  

in view of the securing water resources, mainly met by the rivers flowing down
to Pakistan from Kashmir basin mostly under Indian control, water security is geopolitically
of the utmost importance for Pakistan. As any stoppage of water may be brought
on Pakistani land, the state of Pakistan is rightfully edgy on the water
related matters of Kashmir. Simply, Pakistan is heavily reliant on Kashmir to
meet water demand for fresh water supply and the irrigation on the plains of
Punjab region through the river of Indus with ramifying branches meandering
from Kashmir to Pakistan. As such, any Indian supremacy attempt to be imposed
on the supervision and absolute control of water resources from these rivers
has been a grave concern to Pakistan for decades. To secure the water resources
from Indus, two states signed the Indus Water Treaty in Karacahi on September
19, 1960. Since then, the flow of water to Pakistan has not stopped, yet
Pakistan’s concern that water flow could be brought to stop by India, still
justifies Pakistani side of the argument that Kashmir is strategically of too
much importance to give up.10

all, for Pakistan acting as protectorate of the Muslims in the region, it is
assumed that Kashmiris’ determination on accession to Pakistan is a natural
selection in that the territory at issue is contiguous to Pakistan. Accordingly,
according to the two nation theory that asserts Hindus and Muslims are the
people of two disparate nations in every respect, Muslims are of to possess
their own independent land where the Muslim majority afford to flourish in
accordance with the tenets of Islam of their own accord. As such, this land,
which represents the very idea of what has made Pakistan, should be in Pakistan’s
land where the Muslims of the region can dwell and live independently, which
conversely undermines the idea of the statehood.11

1 Pacific University, Great Britain’s Motives in Jammu and
Kashmir, https://www.pacificu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Potter.pdf  (accessed 10.12.2017)

2 Fozia N. Lone, ‘The Creation Story of Kashmiri People: The Right To Self-Determination’,
The Denning Law Journal, Vol. 21, No. 1, 2009, pp. 1-25

3 Musarat J. Cheema. ‘Pakistan – India Conflict with Special
Reference to Kashmir’, South Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No.1, 2015, pp. 45–46

4 Maps of India, India-Pakistan Border, https://www.mapsofindia.com/jammu-kashmir/india-pakistan-border-dispute.html
(accessed 13.12.2017)

5 Sumit Ganguly, William R. Thompson,
Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation,
and Limitations on Two-level Games, Stanford Universty Press, CA, 2011, pp.

6 Barry R. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’,
 Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1, 1993, pp.

7 Andrew Mumford, ‘Proxy Warfare and the Future of Conflict’,
The RUSI Journal, Vol. 158, No. 2, 2013, pp. 40-46

8 Angel Rabasa et all, The Lessons of Mumbai, RAND Corporation,
CA, 2009,  pp. 13-17

9 Praveen Swami,  India, Pakistan and the Secret
Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947–2004, Routledge, New York, 2007, pp.

10 World Bank Group, Indus Waters Treaty,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA /
Resources/223497-1105737253588/IWT_Article_XI.pdf    (accessed 23.12.2017

11 Shaikh Farzana, Making Sense of Pakistan, Columbia
University Press, New York, 2009, pp. 187-188